ENOVIX CORP (ENVX)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ENOVIX CORP · Meeting: June 11, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

3 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Thurman John RodgersTSR underperformance vs peerssitting CEO overboarding

Rodgers has served since 2020 and the company's 3-year stock return of -47.7% trails the compensation peer group median by 64.5 percentage points, well above the 20-point trigger for negative absolute TSR; additionally, as the sitting CEO of SunPower Inc. he holds two outside public board seats (ENVX and Enphase Energy), violating the policy's limit of one outside seat for sitting CEOs — both triggers independently require an AGAINST vote and the 5-year record (-53.4% vs peer median gap of -71.7pp, exceeding the 20pp threshold) confirms sustained underperformance with no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Betsy AtkinsTSR underperformance vs peers

Atkins has served since 2021, giving her tenure that fully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; the company's 3-year return of -47.7% trails the peer group median by 64.5 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the 5-year record (-71.7pp vs peers) confirms the underperformance is not a transient dip, so no mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Pegah EbrahimiTSR underperformance vs peers

Ebrahimi has served since November 2021, fully overlapping the 3-year underperformance period; the company's 3-year return of -47.7% trails the peer group median by 64.5 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the 5-year record (-71.7pp vs peers) confirms sustained underperformance with no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Gregory ReichowTSR underperformance vs peers

Reichow has served since July 2021, fully overlapping the 3-year underperformance period; the company's 3-year return of -47.7% trails the peer group median by 64.5 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR, and the 5-year record (-71.7pp vs peers) confirms the underperformance is sustained with no mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Raj TalluriTSR underperformance vs peers

Talluri joined as a director in January 2023, giving him tenure that meaningfully overlaps the 3-year underperformance period as CEO and director; the company's 3-year return of -47.7% trails the peer group median by 64.5 percentage points, far exceeding the 20-point threshold for negative absolute TSR — per policy, executive directors are subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors independently of the Say on Pay vote, and the 5-year data is not applicable as he joined in 2023.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Bernard Gutmann

Gutmann joined in June 2023, less than 36 months ago and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, directors who joined more than 24 months ago but whose tenure covers less than half the underperformance period are flagged but not automatically voted against, and given his relevant semiconductor/finance expertise and no other disqualifying factors, a FOR vote is appropriate.

✓ FOR
Joseph Malchow

Malchow joined in June 2023, less than 36 months ago and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, directors who joined more than 24 months ago but whose tenure covers less than half the underperformance period are flagged but not automatically voted against, and given his relevant technical and financial expertise and no other disqualifying factors, a FOR vote is appropriate.

✓ FOR
J. Daniel McCranie

McCranie joined in August 2025, less than 24 months ago, making him fully exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the policy's new-director exemption; no other disqualifying factors apply.

Five of eight directors (Rodgers, Atkins, Ebrahimi, Reichow, and Talluri) receive AGAINST votes due to significant stock underperformance — the company's 3-year return of -47.7% trails compensation peers by 64.5 percentage points, well above the 20-point trigger applicable to companies with negative absolute returns. Rodgers also receives an AGAINST vote for the independent reason that, as a sitting CEO at SunPower Inc., he holds two outside public board seats in violation of the overboarding policy. The three newer directors (Gutmann, Malchow joined June 2023; McCranie joined August 2025) receive FOR votes because their tenure is too short to hold them fully accountable for the prior underperformance period.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Dr. Raj Talluri

Total Comp

$7,996,489

Prior Support

77%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of approximately $8.0 million is within a reasonable range for a semiconductor/advanced technology CEO at a $1.4 billion market cap company, and the pay mix is strongly performance-oriented — the company discloses that 92% of the CEO's target pay is variable and at risk, with only 8% in fixed salary, well exceeding the policy's 50-60% variable pay requirement. On the pay-for-performance alignment check, incentive payouts actually declined significantly below target (the annual bonus paid out at 60% of target and long-term performance stock awards earned at 44-72% of target), demonstrating that the incentive structure is functioning as intended and executives did not receive above-benchmark variable pay while shareholders experienced losses. Prior-year say-on-pay support was 77%, above the 70% threshold that would require visible changes, and the company conducted extensive shareholder outreach and enhanced compensation disclosures in response to feedback; a robust clawback policy is in place.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,302,000

Non-Audit Fees

$55,000

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $20,000 plus tax fees of $33,000 plus other fees of $2,000 = $55,000) represent approximately 2.4% of audit fees of $2,302,000, well below the 50% threshold that would trigger concern; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the filing so the tenure trigger cannot fire per policy; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $1.4 billion company; no material restatements were identified.

Overall Assessment

This ballot presents three standard annual meeting proposals; the most significant governance concern is severe and sustained stock underperformance — Enovix's 3-year return of -47.7% trails its compensation peer group median by 64.5 percentage points — which triggers AGAINST votes for five of the eight director nominees who have meaningful tenure overlap with that period. The Say on Pay and auditor ratification proposals both pass the applicable policy screens and receive FOR votes, reflecting a well-structured at-risk compensation program with below-target actual payouts and a clean auditor fee profile.

Filing date: April 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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