HILTON GRAND VACATIONS INC (HGV)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

HILTON GRAND VACATIONS INC · Meeting: May 6, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Nine Director Nominees

2 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Mark D. WangTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2016 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Mr. Wang has served as CEO and director since 2017, and HGV's stock has lost 3.7% over three years while the broader consumer cyclical sector (XLY) gained 63.6% — a gap of more than 67 percentage points, well above the 30-point threshold that triggers an AGAINST vote; the 5-year check does not cure this because the 5-year absolute return of 8.3% falls in the 0-20% tier, and the 5-year gap versus XLY also exceeds the 50-point ETF fallback threshold, confirming sustained underperformance rather than a temporary dip.

✗ AGAINST
Leonard A. PotterTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2017 — full tenure overlapoverboarding check: serves on HGV plus Versant Media Group, SLR Investment Corp, and SuRo Capital — 4 public company boards total

Mr. Potter has been on the board since 2017 and the same sustained TSR underperformance that triggered the AGAINST vote on Mr. Wang applies here in full; additionally, he simultaneously serves on four public company boards (HGV, VSNT, SLRC, and SSSS), which meets the overboarding threshold of four or more public board seats under the voting policy.

✗ AGAINST
Brenda J. BaconTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2017 — full tenure overlap

Ms. Bacon has served on the board since 2017, giving her full overlap with the three-year underperformance period; HGV's stock return of -3.7% versus the sector benchmark's +63.6% exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold by a wide margin, and the 5-year check does not remedy this given the 5-year gap also exceeds the applicable ETF fallback threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Mark H. LazarusTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2017 — full tenure overlap

Mr. Lazarus has been a director since 2017 with full overlap across the underperformance period, and the same wide TSR gap versus the sector benchmark that drives AGAINST votes on the longer-tenured directors applies equally to him; no other mitigating factors are present.

✗ AGAINST
Pamela H. PatsleyTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2016 — full tenure overlap

Ms. Patsley has served on the board since 2016, giving her the longest tenure overlap with the underperformance period; the stock's -3.7% three-year return versus the sector's +63.6% far exceeds the 30-point trigger, and the five-year absolute return of 8.3% (0-20% tier) combined with a five-year ETF gap that also exceeds the 50-point threshold confirms the underperformance is not a short-term anomaly.

✗ AGAINST
David SamburTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2021 — substantial tenure overlap with underperformance period

Mr. Sambur joined the board in August 2021 (more than 24 months ago), so he is subject to the TSR trigger; his tenure covers essentially the entire three-year measurement period, and the -67.3 percentage point gap versus the sector ETF far exceeds the 30-point threshold, with the five-year check also failing to cure the result.

✗ AGAINST
Paul W. WhetsellTSR underperformance trigger: 3yr absolute TSR negative (-3.7%), ETF gap -67.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold; director since 2017 — full tenure overlap

Mr. Whetsell has served on the board since 2017 and carries full overlap with the three-year underperformance window; the same TSR trigger that applies to the other long-tenured directors fires here, and the five-year check does not provide relief given the continued underperformance on the five-year lookback as well.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Christine Cahill

Ms. Cahill joined the board in 2024, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so she is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger and no other disqualifying factors (overboarding, attendance, non-independence on a restricted committee) are present.

✓ FOR
Gail L. Mandel

Ms. Mandel joined the board in 2024, which falls within the 24-month new-director exemption, so she is not held accountable for underperformance that predates her tenure; no other disqualifying factors are present.

Seven of the nine director nominees receive AGAINST votes primarily due to sustained stock price underperformance — HGV's shares lost 3.7% over three years while the consumer cyclical sector benchmark (XLY) gained 63.6%, a gap of 67 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point ETF fallback trigger for companies with negative absolute three-year returns. The two newer directors (Ms. Cahill and Ms. Mandel, both joining in 2024) are exempt from the TSR trigger under the 24-month new-director rule and receive FOR votes. Mr. Potter also receives an AGAINST vote on the separate ground of overboarding, as he sits on four public company boards simultaneously.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Mark D. Wang

Total Comp

$14,067,191

Prior Support

85%%

The prior year say-on-pay vote received 85% support, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response from the company, and no structural concerns arise from that result. CEO total compensation of approximately $14.1 million is within a reasonable range for a hospitality/consumer cyclical company of HGV's size (~$3.6B market cap), and the pay structure is heavily weighted toward variable pay — the proxy states that 66% of the CEO's total direct compensation consists of equity-based awards (split between performance-based and service-based restricted stock units), satisfying the 50-60% variable pay requirement. While the company's stock has underperformed the sector over three years (which drove AGAINST votes on director elections), the pay-for-performance check on Say on Pay asks whether above-benchmark variable pay was earned against underperformance — and here variable pay levels are not clearly above benchmark for this market cap tier, so the pay level question governs and supports a FOR vote.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

9 yrs

Audit Fees

$7,679,380

Non-Audit Fees

$1,778,198

Ernst & Young has audited HGV since 2017 (approximately 9 years), well below the 25-year tenure threshold; non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $1,292,224 plus tax fees of $485,974 totaling $1,778,198) represent about 23% of audit fees of $7,679,380, comfortably below the 50% independence-risk threshold; EY is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $3.6 billion public company, and no material financial restatements were disclosed.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 HGV annual meeting ballot contains four proposals; the most significant governance concern is the board's failure to arrest multi-year stock underperformance relative to the consumer cyclical sector, which triggers AGAINST votes on seven of nine director nominees (the two directors appointed in 2024 are exempt as new directors). The auditor ratification and Say on Pay proposals both pass the applicable policy screens and receive FOR votes, while the equity plan amendment falls outside the scope of this policy version.

Filing date: March 17, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence