LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORP (LKFN)
Sector: Financials
2026 Annual Meeting Analysis
LAKELAND FINANCIAL CORP · Meeting: April 14, 2026
Directors FOR
13
Directors AGAINST
0
Say on Pay
FOR
Auditor
FOR
Director Elections
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
No policy triggers apply: LKFN's 3-year price return of 32.1% is strong positive, and the gap versus QABA (-45.3pp) does not reach the 65pp threshold required to trigger a vote against under the strong-positive TSR tier.
All 13 director nominees receive a FOR vote. Although LKFN has trailed the QABA community bank index by 45.3 percentage points over three years, LKFN's own 3-year return is a strong positive 32.1%, placing it in the strong-positive tier where the underperformance threshold to trigger a vote against is 65 percentage points — a bar the actual gap does not clear. No overboarding, independence, attendance, or other disqualifying flags were identified in the filing.
Say on Pay
✓ FORCEO
N/A
Total Comp
N/A
Prior Support
N/A
The proxy filing excerpt provided does not include detailed executive compensation tables, so individual pay benchmarking and pay-mix analysis cannot be performed from the available data. With no specific compensation data triggering a policy concern — no evidence of pay exceeding benchmarks by more than 20–30%, no disclosed absence of a clawback policy, and no prior year vote below 70% identified in the filing — the default vote of FOR applies. Shareholders seeking more detail on the pay program should review the full proxy statement compensation discussion before voting.
Auditor Ratification
✓ FORAuditor
Crowe LLP
Tenure
N/A
Audit Fees
N/A
Non-Audit Fees
N/A
The proxy filing excerpt provided does not include auditor fee data or tenure disclosure, so no policy trigger (non-audit fee ratio or tenure threshold) can be confirmed; under policy, the absence of tenure data means the tenure trigger does not fire, and without fee data the non-audit ratio trigger cannot be applied — the default vote is FOR. Crowe LLP is a large national accounting firm appropriate for a $1.5 billion community bank.
Actual Vote Results
Meeting held April 14, 2026
Director Elections
| Nominee | % FOR | Votes For | Withheld / Against | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Daniel B. Starr | 99.0% | 19.5M | 189,252 | ✓ Elected |
| Melinda J. Creighton Truex | 98.9% | 19.5M | 209,397 | ✓ Elected |
| Darrianne P. Christian | 98.5% | 19.4M | 287,514 | ✓ Elected |
| David M. Findlay | 98.3% | 19.4M | 336,737 | ✓ Elected |
| Brian J. Smith | 97.6% | 19.2M | 471,822 | ✓ Elected |
| Kristin L. Pruitt | 97.2% | 19.2M | 551,855 | ✓ Elected |
| M. Scott Welch | 97.1% | 19.1M | 562,934 | ✓ Elected |
| Emily E. Pichon | 97.1% | 19.1M | 569,987 | ✓ Elected |
| Steven D. Ross | 97.0% | 19.1M | 590,651 | ✓ Elected |
| Robert E. Bartels, Jr. | 96.9% | 19.1M | 614,607 | ✓ Elected |
| Blake W. Augsburger | 94.7% | 18.7M | 1.0M | ✓ Elected |
| Bradley J. Toothaker | 78.9% | 15.6M | 4.2M | ✓ Elected |
| A. Faraz Abbasi | 78.3% | 15.4M | 4.3M | ✓ Elected |
Say on Pay
For 14.7M · Against 4.9M · Abstain 111,686
Auditor Ratification
For 22.3M · Against 298,203 · Abstain 3,031
Overall Assessment
Lakeland Financial Corp's 2026 annual meeting ballot contains three standard proposals: election of 13 directors, ratification of Crowe LLP as auditor, and a non-binding say-on-pay vote on executive compensation. All proposals receive a FOR vote — the director TSR underperformance gap versus the QABA community bank index (-45.3pp) falls short of the 65-percentage-point threshold required to trigger a vote against when the company's own three-year return is a strong positive 32.1%, and no fee, tenure, or compensation data in the available filing excerpt triggers any other policy concern.