Replacing supermajority voting requirements with simple majority voting is a mainstream, well-established governance improvement that directly strengthens shareholder rights — it makes it easier for a majority of shareholders to make their voices heard on important corporate matters, rather than requiring an unusually high threshold that can be difficult to achieve and entrenches existing arrangements. The board itself issued 'No Recommendation' rather than opposing the proposal, which signals it does not view this as harmful to the company. This type of governance reform has broad support among institutional investors and shareholder rights advocates and is consistent with our policy of supporting structural changes that give shareholders more meaningful control.

While an independent board chair is generally a governance positive, the policy analysis here weighs the current circumstances: Brian Niccol joined as CEO only in September 2024 and is in the early stages of executing a significant business turnaround, and the company has responded to this governance concern by appointing a lead independent director (Jørgen Vig Knudstorp) with substantial, clearly defined powers that closely mirror those of an independent chair. Mandating a structural separation at this early stage of a CEO tenure and turnaround — before shareholders have had a chance to observe the current leadership's long-term results — could unnecessarily disrupt the leadership structure during a critical period. Given the robust lead independent director role and the absence of prior-year support data indicating a persistent shareholder concern, the proposal does not clear the bar for a mandatory structural change at this time.

This proposal focuses on a politically contentious healthcare coverage question — whether the company's health benefits include care for individuals who choose to reverse prior gender-related medical treatments. The framing as a shareholder risk report does not change the underlying motivation, which is to use the proxy process to advocate for a particular political and social position on gender-related healthcare. Under our policy, proposals that only make sense as political or social advocacy — regardless of which direction — are disqualified from support, and we apply this symmetry rule consistently. A neutral fiduciary investor would not submit this proposal, and we vote against it.

This proposal requests a report specifically examining compensation and benefits gaps as they relate to reproductive care and gender dysphoria treatments — a framing that reflects a progressive advocacy agenda rather than a neutral fiduciary concern about pay equity generally. While pay equity transparency can be a legitimate governance topic, the specific focus on these politically charged benefit categories indicates the proposal is driven by social advocacy goals rather than pure shareholder value considerations. Under our symmetry rule, ideological motivation from either direction disqualifies a proposal, and a neutral fiduciary investor would frame a pay equity concern more broadly; we vote against.

The framing of this proposal — asking the company to report on 'diagnostic tools created by politicized corporate partners' — is a politically motivated ask that uses corporate governance machinery to advance a conservative critique of the company's use of diversity-related assessment tools and partnerships. A neutral fiduciary investor would not frame a legitimate business risk inquiry this way, and the proposal would not exist absent a political motivation. Under our symmetry rule, we vote against proposals driven by ideological advocacy from either side of the political spectrum.

This proposal asks Starbucks to report on the risks of excluding religious charities from its employee gift-matching program — a topic that exists entirely within a political and religious advocacy context rather than as a mainstream fiduciary concern. Whether or not the underlying policy question has merit, the proposal is designed to pressure the company on a social and religious issue, not to improve shareholder value or governance. Under our policy, proposals that serve political or social advocacy goals — from either direction — are disqualified from support, and we vote against.