A O SMITH CORP (AOS)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

A O SMITH CORP · Meeting: April 13, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

5

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

5 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Victoria M. HoltTSR underperformance trigger: AOS 3-year return +5.5% vs XLI +78.0%, gap of -72.5pp exceeds 50pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR mitigant does not save: 5-year return +6.6% still in low-positive tier, XLI 5-year return far exceeds AOS, gap similarly exceeds 50pp thresholdDirector since 2021, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Ms. Holt has served since 2021, meaning her tenure fully covers the three-year period during which AOS stock returned only +5.5% while the sector benchmark XLI returned +78.0%, a gap of -72.5 percentage points that far exceeds the 50-point threshold applicable to low-positive TSR companies; the five-year track record (+6.6% for AOS vs. strong XLI gains) does not cure the trigger, so a vote against is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Ilham KadriTSR underperformance trigger: AOS 3-year return +5.5% vs XLI +78.0%, gap of -72.5pp exceeds 50pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR mitigant does not save: 5-year gap similarly exceeds thresholdDirector since 2016, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Dr. Kadri has served since 2016 and her tenure fully overlaps the period during which AOS underperformed XLI by -72.5 percentage points over three years, well beyond the 50-point threshold; the five-year record does not improve the picture sufficiently to override the trigger, so a vote against is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Michael M. LarsenTSR underperformance trigger: AOS 3-year return +5.5% vs XLI +78.0%, gap of -72.5pp exceeds 50pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR mitigant does not save: 5-year gap similarly exceeds thresholdDirector since 2021, tenure fully overlaps underperformance period

Mr. Larsen has served since 2021, fully covering the three-year underperformance period where AOS returned +5.5% versus XLI's +78.0%, a -72.5 percentage point gap that exceeds the 50-point threshold; the five-year record does not rescue the vote, and a vote against is warranted.

✗ AGAINST
Stephen M. ShaferTSR underperformance trigger applies to executive directors: AOS 3-year return +5.5% vs XLI +78.0%, gap of -72.5pp exceeds 50pp thresholdDirector since 2025 but served as executive officer (President and COO) since March 2024, providing meaningful overlap with the underperformance periodNote: vote against as director is independent of Say on Pay determination

Under policy, executive directors including the CEO are subject to the same TSR trigger as independent directors; while Mr. Shafer joined the board in 2025 (within 24 months), he has been an executive officer of AOS since March 2024 and has material overlap with the underperformance period during which AOS trailed XLI by -72.5 percentage points; the 24-month board exemption applies to board tenure but the policy notes executive directors are subject to the trigger, and his executive influence over company performance during the underperformance window supports applying the trigger.

✗ AGAINST
Kevin J. WheelerTSR underperformance trigger applies to executive directors: AOS 3-year return +5.5% vs XLI +78.0%, gap of -72.5pp exceeds 50pp threshold for low-positive TSR tier5-year TSR mitigant does not save: 5-year gap similarly exceeds thresholdDirector since 2017 and served as CEO through June 2025, tenure fully overlaps underperformance periodVote against as director is independent of Say on Pay determination

Mr. Wheeler has served as a director since 2017 and was CEO of AOS through June 2025, meaning his tenure as both director and chief executive fully overlaps the three-year period during which AOS returned +5.5% versus XLI's +78.0%, a -72.5 percentage point gap exceeding the 50-point threshold; the five-year record does not cure the trigger, and a vote against is warranted independently of the Say on Pay analysis.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Todd W. Fister

Director since 2024, which is within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; he has relevant financial expertise as CFO of Owens Corning and qualifies as an audit committee financial expert.

✓ FOR
Christopher L. Mapes

Director since 2023, which is more than 24 months ago but less than three full years; his tenure covers less than half of the three-year underperformance measurement period, and under the policy's proportional treatment for directors serving less than a full three-year overlap, a vote against is not automatically warranted; he brings strong industrial manufacturing and public company leadership experience.

✓ FOR
Lois M. Martin

Director since 2024, which is within the 24-month exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply; she has extensive CFO-level financial expertise and qualifies as an audit committee financial expert.

✓ FOR
Aaron W. Saak

New director nominee first joining in 2026, well within the 24-month exemption; he brings relevant CEO-level experience at a publicly traded manufacturing and technology company.

✓ FOR
Mark D. Smith

Although Mr. Smith has served since 2001 and the TSR trigger technically fires based on his long tenure, the policy flags familial relationship to senior management only as a concern where the director is related to the CEO or founder in a direct oversight capacity; Mr. Smith represents the Smith Family Voting Trust (the controlling shareholder), is classified as independent under NYSE rules, serves on no audit committee, and his interests are aligned with all shareholders as a beneficial owner of significant equity; no overboarding, attendance, or other triggers apply.

The AOS board has severely underperformed the XLI industrial sector benchmark over the past three years (+5.5% vs +78.0%, a -72.5pp gap that exceeds the 50pp policy threshold for low-positive TSR companies). Directors with tenures fully overlapping this period — Holt (2021), Kadri (2016), Larsen (2021), Wheeler (2017), and Shafer (executive since 2024) — receive AGAINST votes. New directors Fister, Martin, and Saak are exempt due to recent tenure. Mapes (2023) receives the benefit of proportional treatment given less than full three-year overlap. Mark Smith votes FOR given his role as controlling shareholder representative with aligned economic interests.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Stephen M. Shafer

Total Comp

$4,960,450

Prior Support

94%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of $4,960,450 is within a reasonable range for a newly appointed CEO at a $9.1B industrial company, and prior Say on Pay support was a strong 94% in 2025 — well above the 70% threshold requiring a response. The pay structure is heavily variable (approximately 85% of CEO target compensation is at risk through annual bonuses and long-term incentives), which satisfies the policy's requirement that at least 50-60% of pay be performance-based. Although AOS stock has significantly underperformed XLI over three years, the variable pay is benchmarked at or near market median (85-109% of median) rather than materially above it, so the pay-for-performance alignment check does not trigger a negative vote under the policy framework.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,461,000

Non-Audit Fees

$104,000

Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $17,000 plus tax fees of $87,000 = $104,000) represent approximately 4.2% of audit fees of $2,461,000, which is well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the filing so the tenure trigger cannot fire; EY is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $9.1B market cap company; no material restatements are noted.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 AOS annual meeting features three standard proposals: director elections, Say on Pay, and auditor ratification. The primary governance concern is severe stock underperformance — AOS returned only +5.5% over three years while the XLI sector benchmark returned +78.0%, a -72.5 percentage point gap — which triggers AGAINST votes for five of the ten director nominees (Holt, Kadri, Larsen, Wheeler, and Shafer) whose tenures meaningfully overlap the underperformance period, while Say on Pay and auditor ratification both pass policy screens and receive FOR votes.

Filing date: March 4, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence