ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUITIES RE (ARE)

Sector: Real Estate

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUITIES RE · Meeting: May 13, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

7

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

1 FOR/7 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Joel S. Marcus3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 1994 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Marcus has served since 1994 and bears full accountability for ARE's catastrophic stock performance: over the past three years the stock fell roughly 58.5% while the peer group median rose 14.4%, a gap of 72.9 percentage points — far exceeding the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns — and the five-year record is equally poor (gap of 67.2pp), so no long-term mitigant applies.

✗ AGAINST
Steven R. Hash3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 2013 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Hash has served since 2013 and his tenure fully overlaps the severe underperformance period; ARE's three-year TSR is approximately 58.5% negative while the peer group median is positive 14.4%, a 72.9-percentage-point gap well above the 20-point trigger, and the five-year gap of 67.2pp is equally disqualifying, so no mitigating long-term track record exists.

✗ AGAINST
James P. Cain3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 2015 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Cain has served since 2015 and his tenure fully covers the three-year underperformance window; ARE's three-year TSR is deeply negative at -58.5% against a peer median gain of 14.4%, producing a 72.9-point gap far above the 20-point trigger, and the five-year gap of 67.2pp confirms this is not a transient decline.

✗ AGAINST
Maria C. Freire, PhD3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 2012 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Freire has served since 2012 and bears full responsibility for the underperformance period; ARE's three-year stock return is -58.5% versus a peer median of +14.4%, a 72.9-point shortfall that far exceeds the 20-point policy trigger, and the five-year gap of 67.2pp leaves no basis for a mitigating downgrade.

✗ AGAINST
Richard H. Klein3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 2003 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Klein has served since 2003, giving him complete overlap with the underperformance period; ARE's three-year return of -58.5% against a peer median of +14.4% represents a 72.9-point gap that far exceeds the 20-point trigger, and the five-year record of -67.2pp versus peers confirms sustained destruction of shareholder value.

✗ AGAINST
Sheila K. McGrath3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since December 2023 — tenure exceeds 24 months, covers the bulk of the 3-year underperformance window

McGrath joined in December 2023, which is now beyond the 24-month new-director exemption window; her tenure meaningfully overlaps the severe underperformance period in which ARE's stock fell -58.5% while peers gained 14.4% on average, a 72.9-point gap far above the 20-point trigger, and the five-year gap of 67.2pp removes any long-term mitigant.

✗ AGAINST
Michael A. Woronoff3yr TSR underperformance vs peer median triggers No votegap of -72.9pp vs 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR5yr gap of -67.2pp also exceeds 20pp threshold — no mitigant availabledirector since 2017 — full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Woronoff has served since 2017 and his tenure fully overlaps the three-year period in which ARE's stock declined -58.5% while the peer group median rose 14.4%, a 72.9-point gap far exceeding the 20-point trigger; the five-year relative gap of 67.2pp confirms the underperformance is sustained, leaving no basis for a mitigating adjustment.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Claire Aldridge, PhDexempt from TSR trigger — joined March 2025, within 24-month new-director exemption window

Dr. Aldridge joined the board in March 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption under our policy, so she cannot be held accountable for underperformance that predates her appointment; she also brings relevant AI and life science expertise.

Seven of eight director nominees should receive an AGAINST vote due to ARE's catastrophic stock underperformance: over the past three years the stock fell approximately 58.5% while the company's own compensation peer group median rose 14.4%, a 72.9-percentage-point gap that far exceeds the 20-point threshold triggered when a company's absolute three-year return is negative. The five-year gap of 67.2pp is equally severe, eliminating any long-term mitigant. Only Dr. Claire Aldridge, who joined the board in March 2025 and falls within the 24-month new-director exemption, earns a FOR vote. All votes against are based solely on the TSR trigger and are independent of the Say on Pay assessment.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Peter M. Moglia

Total Comp

$8,844,053

Prior Support

73%%

pay-for-performance misalignment: above-benchmark variable pay while stock underperforms peers by 72.9pp over 3 yearsprior year support of 73% exceeds 70% threshold but TSR underperformance is extreme

While ARE received 73% support on last year's Say on Pay vote (above the 70% threshold that would automatically trigger a No), the pay-for-performance alignment check independently warrants a No vote: the CEO received total compensation of approximately $8.84 million in a year when ARE's stock fell roughly 50% and the three-year total return of -58.5% trailed the company's own peer group median by nearly 73 percentage points — one of the largest gaps we have observed. The proxy discloses that the company engaged with shareholders representing 65% of shares and made some structural improvements, including reducing CEO pay by 14% and increasing performance-based weighting, but these adjustments are insufficient to offset the fundamental failure of incentive pay to reflect the shareholder experience when executives received meaningful above-target compensation while shareholders lost more than half their investment over three years. The incentive structure is not adequately aligned with shareholder outcomes, and we vote AGAINST.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Ernst & Young LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$2,695,551

Non-Audit Fees

$1,860,572

non-audit fees exceed 50% of audit fees — ratio approximately 69%

The combined non-audit fees for 2025 (tax fees of $1,732,915 plus audit-related fees of $127,657, totaling approximately $1,860,572) represent roughly 69% of the core audit fees of $2,695,551, which exceeds the 50% threshold under our policy and raises concerns about whether EY's financial relationship with the company has grown large enough to compromise its independence; accordingly, we vote AGAINST ratification. Auditor tenure was not explicitly disclosed in the proxy, so the tenure trigger cannot be applied, but the fee ratio alone is sufficient to warrant a No vote.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 ARE annual meeting ballot presents three standard proposals; our policy drives AGAINST votes on six of eight director candidates (with one exempt new director and the founder/executive chairman also warranting AGAINST), AGAINST on auditor ratification due to non-audit fees representing approximately 69% of audit fees, and AGAINST on Say on Pay due to severe pay-for-performance misalignment in a year when the stock fell 50% and three-year returns trailed the peer group by nearly 73 percentage points. Only Dr. Claire Aldridge, who joined the board in March 2025 and is within the new-director exemption window, receives a FOR vote among the director slate.

Filing date: April 1, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

14 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

BXPBXP, Inc.
CCICrown Castle Inc.
EQREquity Residential
EXRExtra Space Storage Inc.
DOCHealthpeak Properties, Inc.
HSTHost Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
INVHInvitation Homes Inc.
IRMIron Mountain Incorporated
KIMKimco Realty Corporation
UDRUDR, Inc.
VTRVentas, Inc.
VNOVornado Realty Trust
WYWeyerhaeuser Company
WPCW.P. Carey Inc.