BALL CORP (BALL)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

BALL CORP · Meeting: April 29, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

9

Directors AGAINST

0

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

9 FOR
✓ FOR
John A. Bryant

Bryant has served since 2018 (within the 3-year TSR evaluation window), brings strong CEO and financial expertise, holds 3 outside board seats which is within the 4-seat overboarding limit, and the 3-year TSR underperformance gap of -40.7pp does not exceed the 65pp threshold required to trigger a no vote given Ball's positive absolute 3-year return.

✓ FOR
Aaron M. Erter

Erter joined the board in 2024, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he holds 1 outside public board seat and has relevant executive leadership experience.

✓ FOR
Ronald J. Lewis

Lewis joined the board in November 2025, well within the 24-month new-director exemption, and as the newly appointed CEO his board seat is appropriate; no overboarding or other policy flags apply.

✓ FOR
Cynthia A. Niekamp

Niekamp has served since 2016, holds 1 outside board seat, and while her tenure overlaps the underperformance period, the 3-year TSR gap of -40.7pp does not exceed the 65pp trigger threshold given Ball's positive absolute 3-year return; she brings relevant manufacturing and finance expertise.

✓ FOR
John E. Panichella

Panichella joined the board in October 2025, well within the 24-month new-director exemption, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he holds no outside public board seats and brings deep global industrial operating experience.

✓ FOR
Todd A. Penegor

Penegor has served since 2019, holds 2 outside public board seats (Papa Johns and Dutch Bros) as a sitting CEO, which meets the 2-seat limit exactly and does not trigger the overboarding rule; the 3-year TSR gap of -40.7pp does not exceed the 65pp threshold.

✓ FOR
Cathy D. Ross

Ross has served since 2017, holds no current outside public board seats, brings strong CFO-level financial expertise as audit committee chair, and the 3-year TSR underperformance gap does not exceed the 65pp trigger threshold.

✓ FOR
Betty J. Sapp

Sapp has served since 2019, holds no outside public board seats, and brings unique government and cybersecurity expertise; the 3-year TSR gap of -40.7pp does not exceed the 65pp trigger threshold for a company with positive absolute 3-year returns.

✓ FOR
Stuart A. Taylor II

Taylor has served since 1999 as the newly appointed independent Chairman, holds 2 outside board seats within policy limits, and while his long tenure overlaps the underperformance period, the -40.7pp gap does not exceed the 65pp threshold required given Ball's positive absolute 3-year TSR; the 5-year TSR of -20.3% combined with his long track record means the recent underperformance does not warrant a no vote under the mitigant framework.

All nine director nominees receive a FOR recommendation. Ball's 3-year price return of +22.9% is in the strong-positive tier (>+20%), meaning the ETF underperformance threshold to trigger a no vote is 65 percentage points; the actual gap versus XLY is only 40.7pp, so the TSR trigger does not fire for any tenured director. Two directors (Erter and Lewis) joined within the past 24 months and are automatically exempt. Panichella also joined within the exemption window. No overboarding, attendance, independence, or familial relationship flags were identified.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Ronald J. Lewis

Total Comp

$4,218,225

Prior Support

93% average over last three years%

The new CEO Ronald Lewis received total compensation of approximately $4.2 million for a partial year in the role (appointed November 10, 2025), which appears well within benchmark for a CEO at a $16.6B consumer packaging company; his pay reflects a mid-year transition and is not indicative of a full-year above-benchmark package. The compensation structure is heavily performance-oriented — the majority of pay is at-risk through performance stock awards (50% of long-term incentives), stock options (25%), and a short-term incentive plan with measurable financial metrics (adjusted operating cash flow and volume growth) — well exceeding the 50-60% variable pay threshold. Ball has a robust clawback policy and strong prior shareholder support averaging 93% over three years, so no responsiveness concern applies.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

The proxy filing does not provide the auditor fee table in the extracted text, so the non-audit fee ratio cannot be calculated; in the absence of confirmed fee data the policy defaults to FOR. PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for Ball's $16.6B market cap, and no material restatements or other disqualifying factors were identified. Auditor tenure is not disclosed in the provided text, so the tenure trigger cannot fire per policy.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Ball Corporation annual meeting ballot contains four proposals: election of nine directors, ratification of PwC as auditor, a non-binding say-on-pay vote, and an equity plan amendment. All standard proposals receive FOR recommendations — the director slate passes TSR, overboarding, and qualification screens; the compensation program is strongly performance-oriented with a new CEO at a reasonable partial-year pay level; and the auditor is a Big 4 firm with no fee ratio concerns identified from available data.

Filing date: March 17, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence