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BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS (BETR)

Sector: Financials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

BETTER HOME FINANCE HOLDING CLASS · Meeting: June 10, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

3

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of the eight nominees identified in the accompanying Proxy Statement to serve as directors until the next annual meeting of stockholders

3 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Harit Talwar⚑ TSR trigger ETF fallback: 3yr return -91.9% vs XLF +65.4%, gap of -157.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ 5yr TSR mitigant does not apply: 5yr return also -91.8% vs XLF, sustained underperformance⚑ non independent director serving as chairman

Mr. Talwar has served as Chairman since August 2023 (tenure exceeds 24 months), and the stock has lost roughly 92% of its value over three years while the financial sector ETF (XLF) gained about 65%, a gap of more than 157 percentage points — far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold for a company with negative absolute returns; the five-year return is equally poor, so the longer track record does not provide any relief.

✗ AGAINST
Vishal Garg⚑ TSR trigger ETF fallback: 3yr return -91.9% vs XLF +65.4%, gap of -157.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ 5yr TSR mitigant does not apply: 5yr return also -91.8% vs XLF, sustained underperformance⚑ CEO as director subject to same TSR trigger⚑ multiple related party transactions as CEO founder

Mr. Garg is the founder and CEO and has served on the board since the company's inception; as an executive director he is subject to the same TSR trigger as all other directors, and the stock's roughly 92% three-year decline against XLF's 65% gain — a gap of over 157 percentage points — clearly fires the trigger; additionally, multiple related-party transactions with entities he controls (TheNumber, Notable, 1/0 Capital) raise governance concerns beyond stock performance.

✗ AGAINST
Michael Farello⚑ TSR trigger ETF fallback: 3yr return -91.9% vs XLF +65.4%, gap of -157.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ 5yr TSR mitigant does not apply: sustained underperformance over 5 years

Mr. Farello has served on the board since August 2023 (tenure exceeds 24 months), so the full three-year underperformance period falls squarely within his tenure; the stock's roughly 92% three-year loss against the financial sector ETF (XLF) rising about 65% produces a gap far exceeding the 30-point trigger, and the five-year record is equally poor.

✗ AGAINST
Arnaud Massenet⚑ TSR trigger ETF fallback: 3yr return -91.9% vs XLF +65.4%, gap of -157.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ 5yr TSR mitigant does not apply: sustained underperformance over 5 years⚑ non independent per board determination

Mr. Massenet has served since August 2023 (tenure exceeds 24 months), placing his entire tenure within the three-year underperformance period; the stock's roughly 92% loss against XLF's 65% gain exceeds the trigger threshold by a wide margin, and the five-year record offers no relief; the board has also designated him as non-independent.

✗ AGAINST
Prabhu Narasimhan⚑ TSR trigger ETF fallback: 3yr return -91.9% vs XLF +65.4%, gap of -157.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR⚑ 5yr TSR mitigant does not apply: sustained underperformance over 5 years⚑ non independent per board determination⚑ consulting arrangement creates conflict

Mr. Narasimhan has served since August 2023 (tenure exceeds 24 months) and the board has designated him as non-independent; the stock's roughly 92% three-year decline against XLF's 65% gain fires the TSR trigger with a gap far exceeding the 30-point threshold, the five-year record is equally poor, and he has a consulting arrangement with the company that further complicates his independence.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
David Barse⚑ new director exemption: joined August 2025, within 24 months of meeting date

Mr. Barse joined the board in August 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he brings relevant investment and public company board experience and no independence or attendance concerns are identified.

✓ FOR
Hugh R. Frater⚑ new director exemption: joined March 2026, within 24 months of meeting date

Mr. Frater joined the board in March 2026, well within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he brings deep relevant experience in mortgage finance, including as former CEO of Fannie Mae, and qualifies as an audit committee financial expert.

✓ FOR
Bhaskar Menon⚑ new director exemption: joined August 2025, within 24 months of meeting date

Mr. Menon joined the board in August 2025, within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR trigger does not apply; he serves as lead independent director and audit committee chair and qualifies as an audit committee financial expert, which are positive governance attributes.

Of the eight nominees, four qualify for the new-director exemption (Barse, Frater, and Menon joined within the past 24 months) or otherwise pass screening (Frater); the remaining four long-tenured directors (Talwar, Garg, Farello, Massenet, and Narasimhan) all trigger the TSR underperformance rule — the stock has lost about 92% over three years while the financial sector ETF (XLF) gained about 65%, a gap of over 157 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point policy threshold for companies with negative absolute returns, and the five-year record offers no relief.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Vishal Garg

Total Comp

$26,689,276

Prior Support

N/A

⚑ CEO total compensation $26.7M likely far above benchmark for $677M market cap financial services company⚑ transaction bonus performance condition waived by board: $4.85M second installment paid to CEO after board waived vesting criteria⚑ discretionary bonus structure lacks clear measurable performance conditions⚑ pay for performance misalignment: stock down 91.9pct over 3 years while CEO received $26.7M in 2025⚑ board waived performance vesting on transaction bonus creating effectively fixed pay disguised as variable

CEO Vishal Garg received $26.7 million in total pay in 2025 — including a $4.85 million transaction bonus whose performance condition was waived by the board, a $750,000 annual discretionary bonus with no disclosed measurable performance criteria, and over $20 million in stock awards — at a company with a $677 million market cap where the stock has lost roughly 92% of its value over three years; this level of pay is almost certainly well above the benchmark for a CEO at a company of this size in financial services. The board's decision to waive the performance vesting condition on the transaction bonus is a particularly serious concern, because it turned what was supposed to be a pay-for-performance award into guaranteed compensation, directly contradicting the principle that incentive pay should be earned through results shareholders actually experienced.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

BDO USA, P.C.

Tenure

0 yrs

Audit Fees

$3,100,000

Non-Audit Fees

$248,000

⚑ non audit fee ratio 8pct well below 50pct threshold⚑ BDO is new auditor no tenure concern⚑ material weakness in 2024 remediated by end of 2025 not attributed to audit failure

BDO is a newly appointed large national firm replacing Deloitte, so there is no tenure concern; using Deloitte's 2025 fee data (the most recent available), non-audit fees of approximately $248,000 (tax fees of $67,000 plus other fees of $181,000) represent only about 8% of audit fees of $3,100,000, well below the 50% policy threshold; a material weakness was previously disclosed for 2024 but was remediated by year-end 2025 and was not attributed to an audit failure by Deloitte, so it does not trigger an against vote on the incoming auditor.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Better Home & Finance annual meeting features a director slate where five of the eight nominees should receive against votes due to severe three-year stock underperformance (the stock lost roughly 92% while the financial sector ETF gained 65%), with only the three directors who joined within the past 24 months exempt from that trigger; the Say on Pay vote also warrants an against vote given the CEO's $26.7 million pay package at a company with a $677 million market cap and a stock that has lost nearly all of its value, compounded by the board's decision to waive performance conditions on a transaction bonus. The only straightforward affirmative vote on the ballot is the ratification of incoming auditor BDO USA, P.C., a well-qualified national firm with clean fee ratios and no tenure concerns as a new appointment.

Filing date: April 30, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence