COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC (CBSH)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC · Meeting: April 24, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

4

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of the 2029 Class of Directors

/4 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Blackford F. BrauerTSR underperformance vs QABA: 3yr gap -39.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since May 2022 (tenure >24 months, covers majority of underperformance period); 5yr return -20.6% also underperforms QABA, no 5yr mitigant available

Mr. Brauer has served since May 2022, which means his tenure fully overlaps the period during which CBSH's stock return of -0.3% over three years trailed the QABA community bank index by 39.7 percentage points — well above the 30-point threshold that triggers an against vote; the 5-year return of -20.6% also lags QABA, so the longer-term record does not provide relief.

✗ AGAINST
W. Kyle ChapmanTSR underperformance vs QABA: 3yr gap -39.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since May 2022 (tenure >24 months, covers majority of underperformance period); 5yr return -20.6% also underperforms QABA, no 5yr mitigant available

Mr. Chapman has also served since May 2022, placing his full tenure within the underperformance window; CBSH's three-year stock return trailed the QABA community bank index by 39.7 percentage points (-0.3% vs. +39.4%), exceeding the 30-point trigger, and the five-year record of -20.6% does not clear the bar for the mitigant that would downgrade this to a FOR vote.

✗ AGAINST
Karen L. DanielTSR underperformance vs QABA: 3yr gap -39.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since January 2018 (long tenure, full overlap with underperformance period); 5yr return -20.6% also underperforms QABA, no 5yr mitigant availablefamilial relationship flag: note — no familial relationship to senior management, flag cleared

Ms. Daniel has been a director since January 2018, so her tenure fully encompasses the three-year underperformance period during which CBSH trailed the QABA community bank index by 39.7 percentage points; the five-year return of -20.6% also lags QABA, meaning the longer-term record does not soften the trigger to a FOR vote.

✗ AGAINST
David W. KemperTSR underperformance vs QABA: 3yr gap -39.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director since February 1982 (long tenure, full overlap); 5yr return -20.6% also underperforms QABA, no 5yr mitigant availableexecutive director: father of CEO John W. Kemper — familial relationship to CEO is a governance concern under policyrelated party transactions: received $455,440 salary plus $328,000 bonus plus $249,946 equity as Executive Chairman in 2025

Mr. Kemper has served on the board since 1982, is the father of the sitting CEO, and received over $1 million in compensation from the company in 2025 as Executive Chairman — all of which raise additional governance concerns beyond the TSR trigger; CBSH's three-year stock return trailed the QABA community bank index by 39.7 percentage points, exceeding the 30-point threshold, and the five-year return of -20.6% similarly underperforms QABA, leaving no basis to downgrade this to a FOR vote.

For Analysis

All four nominees for the 2029 director class are subject to an AGAINST vote because Commerce Bancshares' three-year stock return of roughly -0.3% trailed the QABA community bank index (which gained about 39.4%) by 39.7 percentage points, well above the 30-point trigger that applies when a company's absolute return is negative. Each nominee's tenure overlaps substantially with the underperformance period, and the five-year return of -20.6% also underperforms QABA, eliminating the longer-term mitigant. David W. Kemper carries the additional concern of being the father of the CEO and receiving significant executive compensation while simultaneously sitting on the board.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

John W. Kemper

Total Comp

$6,498,082

Prior Support

92%%

annual bonus paid at 183pct of target while TSR lags QABA: variable pay above benchmark level warrants pay-for-performance checkpay mix review: proxy discloses variable compensation at approximately 83% of CEO total pay, well above the 50-60% threshold2026 LTI redesign: company has proactively added performance-based stock units with peer-relative TSR, ROAE and EPS metrics starting in 2026, demonstrating responsiveness to alignment concerns

The CEO's total reported pay of $6.5 million is within a reasonable range for a $7 billion regional bank CEO, and the pay mix is strongly variable at roughly 83% — well above the 50-60% minimum the policy requires. While the annual bonus paid out at 183.6% of target during a year when the stock significantly lagged the QABA community bank index raises a pay-for-performance concern, the company's underlying operating performance was genuinely strong (record net income of $566 million, top-quartile return on assets at 1.79% versus a peer median of 1.17%), providing a credible business rationale for the incentive payout. Critically, the company received 92% shareholder support on last year's say-on-pay vote and has announced a meaningful redesign of its 2026 long-term incentive plan to add forward-looking performance stock units tied to peer-relative TSR, return on equity, and earnings per share growth, demonstrating genuine responsiveness that supports a FOR vote.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

tenure not disclosed: KPMG tenure not explicitly stated in the proxy; policy requires confirmed data to fire the tenure trigger — voting FOR and noting absence as a minor negativefee data not extractable: the auditor fee table was referenced in the filing text but the actual dollar amounts were truncated in the provided data; cannot calculate non-audit fee ratio — defaulting to FOR per policy

The proxy references KPMG as the company's auditor and the Audit and Risk Committee states it considered non-audit services compatibility with independence, but the specific fee dollar amounts were not available in the extracted data provided; because the policy requires confirmed data to trigger a No vote on either the fee ratio or tenure, and KPMG is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $7 billion market-cap bank, the default FOR vote applies.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Commerce Bancshares annual meeting presents three proposals: all four director nominees are subject to AGAINST votes because the stock has significantly trailed the QABA community bank index over both one- and three-year periods, and the five-year record offers no relief; the auditor ratification defaults to FOR given a Big 4 firm and the absence of confirmed data to trigger a No vote; and the Say on Pay vote is FOR because pay levels are reasonable, the pay mix is heavily variable, underlying operating performance was genuinely strong, and the company has proactively redesigned its 2026 incentive plan to better align executive pay with shareholder returns.

Filing date: March 13, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence