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DIGIMARC CORP (DMRC)

Sector: Information Technology

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

DIGIMARC CORP · Meeting: April 30, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

8

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Eight Directors

/8 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Riley McCormack⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year return -86.8% also deeply negative — no 5-year mitigant applies

As CEO and director, McCormack has overseen catastrophic stock price destruction of 75% over three years while the technology sector benchmark XLK gained 91.7%, a gap of nearly 167 percentage points — far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold; the 5-year record is even worse at -86.8%, so no mitigating long-term track record applies.

✗ AGAINST
Katie Kool⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year return -86.8% — no 5-year mitigant applies

As board chair, Kool has served during a period of severe and sustained stock price decline of 75% over three years against a technology sector benchmark (XLK) that gained 91.7%, a gap of 167 percentage points that triggers the policy threshold; the 5-year record confirms this is not a transient trough.

✗ AGAINST
Director 3⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

The company's stock has lost 75% of its value over three years while the technology sector ETF XLK gained 91.7%, a 167-percentage-point gap that far exceeds the policy trigger; the 5-year record at -86.8% confirms sustained underperformance with no mitigating long-term track record.

✗ AGAINST
Director 4⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

This director has served during a period of severe stock price decline of 75% over three years against a technology sector benchmark (XLK) that gained 91.7%; the 167-percentage-point gap triggers the policy No vote and the 5-year record provides no relief.

✗ AGAINST
Director 5⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

DMRC's stock has declined 75% over three years while the technology sector ETF XLK rose 91.7%, representing a 167-percentage-point underperformance gap that triggers the policy threshold; with a 5-year return of -86.8%, there is no longer-term track record that would soften this outcome.

✗ AGAINST
Director 6⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

The company's 75% stock price decline over three years against a 91.7% gain for the technology sector benchmark XLK represents a 167-percentage-point gap that far exceeds the policy trigger; the 5-year return of -86.8% confirms this is sustained value destruction, not a temporary trough.

✗ AGAINST
Director 7⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

Shareholders have lost 75% of their investment over three years while the technology sector benchmark XLK gained 91.7%; this 167-point gap triggers the policy against directors with meaningful tenure overlap, and the 5-year record at -86.8% provides no mitigating longer-term performance.

✗ AGAINST
Director 8⚑ TSR underperformance: 3-year price return -75.0% vs XLK +91.7%, gap of -166.7pp exceeds 30pp threshold; 5-year -86.8% — no mitigant

DMRC's 75% stock decline over three years versus XLK's 91.7% gain represents a 167-percentage-point gap that triggers the policy No vote for directors with meaningful tenure; with a 5-year return of -86.8%, there is no longer track record of adequate performance to serve as a mitigant.

For Analysis

The proxy discloses eight directors up for election but does not individually name all non-CEO directors in the extracted filing text; the TSR underperformance trigger fires decisively for the entire slate given DMRC's -75.0% three-year return versus XLK's +91.7% gain, a -166.7 percentage point gap that vastly exceeds the 30-point threshold applicable to companies with negative absolute returns. The 5-year return of -86.8% eliminates any mitigating long-term track record. Any director who joined within the past 24 months would be exempt — shareholders should check individual tenure dates disclosed in the full proxy. Note: the proxy names Riley McCormack and Katie Kool (Chairman) explicitly; full names of remaining six directors are not individually extracted in the provided filing text, but the same TSR trigger applies to all qualifying directors.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Riley McCormack

Total Comp

$2,449,771

Prior Support

N/A

⚑ Pay-for-performance misalignment: variable pay above benchmark while 3-year TSR underperforms XLK by 166.7pp⚑ Stock declined 75% over 3 years and 86.8% over 5 years while CEO received $2.45M total compensation

The CEO received total compensation of $2,449,771 in 2025, of which base salary was only 17% — meaning 83% was variable or performance-based, which satisfies the pay-mix test on its face. However, the pay-for-performance alignment check fails decisively: DMRC's stock has declined 75% over three years while the technology sector benchmark XLK gained 91.7%, a gap of 167 percentage points, meaning shareholders have lost roughly three-quarters of their investment while executives continued to receive above-benchmark equity grants and cash bonuses. The SEC's own pay-versus-performance table shows that compensation actually paid to the CEO in 2025 was negative (-$1.36M) due to declining equity values, which is a partial mitigant showing the program does respond to stock price declines — however, the absolute level of reported compensation ($2.45M) against a backdrop of sustained catastrophic stock price destruction and ongoing net losses (net loss of $32.3M in 2025) warrants a No vote on pay-for-performance alignment grounds.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

KPMG LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

$0

The proxy discloses that no audit-related fees, tax fees, or other fees were paid to KPMG in 2024 or 2025, meaning non-audit fees are zero and the non-audit ratio is 0% — well below the 50% threshold that would trigger a No vote. KPMG is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a Nasdaq-listed company. Auditor tenure is not disclosed in the extracted filing text, so no tenure trigger can be confirmed and policy requires a For vote in that circumstance.

Stockholder Proposals

2 proposals submitted by shareholders

Proposal 1

Reorganization Proposal — Approval of Agreement and Plan of Reorganization to Effect Holding Company Structure

✓ FOR
Filed by:Digimarc Corporation Board of DirectorsOtherCharter Amendment
Board recommends: FOR
⚑ Board-proposed structural reorganization⚑ No change in shareholder voting rights or economic ownership⚑ Expected cash savings from elimination of payroll tax withholding obligations⚑ New Long-Term Equity Incentive structure ties employee compensation to company profitability⚑ Shareholders receive one-for-one exchange of shares with no dilution

This is a board-proposed reorganization that converts Digimarc into a holding company structure (Digimarc Parent, Inc.) primarily to enable a new equity incentive arrangement for employees that the company says will reduce cash tax withholding costs and better align pay with company profitability. Shareholders exchange their current shares on a one-for-one basis with no change in voting rights, economic ownership, or shareholder protections — the new company's articles and bylaws will be substantially identical to the current ones. While the stock's severe underperformance raises concerns about board stewardship generally, the reorganization itself is a neutral-to-positive structural change that does not entrench management, does not transfer value away from shareholders, and offers potential cash savings and better incentive alignment — supporting this proposal is consistent with shareholder interests.

Proposal 5

Adjournment Proposal — Approval of Adjournment of Annual Meeting to Solicit Additional Proxies if Insufficient Votes to Approve Reorganization Proposal

✓ FOR
Filed by:Digimarc Corporation Board of DirectorsOtherGovernance
Board recommends: FOR

This is a routine procedural proposal to allow the board to adjourn the meeting if the reorganization vote falls short of the required majority, giving the company additional time to solicit proxies. Adjournment proposals tied to a valid substantive vote are standard meeting housekeeping and do not raise governance concerns. Since we are recommending FOR on the underlying Reorganization Proposal, supporting the adjournment mechanism is consistent.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 Digimarc annual meeting presents five proposals, with the most consequential being a holding company reorganization and the routine director elections, auditor ratification, and say-on-pay vote. The dominant issue across the ballot is DMRC's catastrophic stock performance — a 75% decline over three years versus a 91.7% gain for the technology sector benchmark XLK — which triggers Against votes on the full director slate (subject to the 24-month new-director exemption) and on executive compensation due to pay-for-performance misalignment, while the auditor ratification passes cleanly on zero non-audit fees and the reorganization itself is a neutral structural change that merits shareholder support.

Filing date: March 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence