FISERV INC (FISV)
Sector: Financials
2026 Annual Meeting Analysis
FISERV INC · Meeting: May 21, 2026
Directors FOR
6
Directors AGAINST
5
Say on Pay
AGAINST
Auditor
AGAINST
Director Elections
Election of Directors
Against Analysis
As CEO and director since 2025, Mr. Lyons joined during an already-distressed period, but both the 3-year TSR gap (-54.5pp vs. the 20pp threshold for negative absolute returns) and the 5-year TSR gap (-67.3pp) far exceed the policy trigger thresholds, and the 5-year mitigant does not rescue this vote because the 5-year underperformance also exceeds the applicable threshold.
Mr. de Castro has served since 2019, meaning his tenure fully covers the period of severe stock underperformance; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.
Mr. DiSimone has served since 2018, meaning his tenure fully covers the period of severe stock underperformance; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.
Ms. Mamilli has served since 2021, meaning her tenure substantially overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.
Ms. Yarkoni has served since 2023, meaning her tenure covers a meaningful portion of the 3-year underperformance period; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.
For Analysis
Mr. Nixon joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.
Ms. Cohen joined the board in March 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to her.
Ms. Dufétel joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to her.
Mr. Fritz joined in 2024, giving him less than 24 months of tenure and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, this warrants a flag but does not automatically trigger a No vote, and no other disqualifying factors are present.
Mr. Gopal joined in 2024, giving him less than 24 months of tenure and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, this warrants a flag but does not automatically trigger a No vote, and no other disqualifying factors are present.
Mr. Shedlin joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.
Fiserv's stock has lost roughly half its value over three years while the disclosed compensation peer group median rose 5%, a gap of -54.5 percentage points that far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold applicable to a company with negative absolute 3-year TSR. The 5-year gap (-67.3pp) is equally severe, meaning the policy's 5-year mitigant cannot convert any AGAINST vote to FOR. Directors with tenure meaningfully overlapping the underperformance period (de Castro, DiSimone, Mamilli, Yarkoni, and CEO Lyons) receive AGAINST votes; the four directors who joined in 2024-2026 receive FOR votes under the new-director exemption or partial-tenure flag rule.
Say on Pay
✗ AGAINSTCEO
Michael P. Lyons
Total Comp
$70,341,992
Prior Support
91%%
The CEO's total reported compensation of $70.3 million for 2025 is exceptionally high for the leader of a company whose stock fell nearly 75% during the year and whose shareholders have experienced a 3-year total return of -49.5% while the peer group median returned +5.0% — a gap of more than 54 percentage points. While the company appropriately zeroed out the annual cash bonus for missing targets, the bulk of Mr. Lyons's pay consisted of large replacement and sign-on awards that vest regardless of Fiserv's own performance outcomes, effectively functioning as fixed pay disguised as variable pay, which is exactly the condition our policy flags as a No vote. Additionally, the board granted Mr. Lyons a supplemental retention equity award worth approximately $30 million in early 2026 — before he had completed even a full year as CEO — at a time when shareholders were still absorbing devastating losses, and this level of discretionary above-benchmark incentive pay is not consistent with the shareholder experience.
Auditor Ratification
✗ AGAINSTAuditor
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Tenure
N/A
Audit Fees
$12,211,000
Non-Audit Fees
$12,723,000
The fees paid to Deloitte for services other than the core audit — including audit-related work such as service organization reports and registration statement reviews ($11,142,000) plus tax consulting ($1,581,000), totaling $12,723,000 — exceed the core audit fee of $12,211,000 by a ratio of roughly 104%, well above the 50% threshold in our policy; a non-audit relationship this large relative to the audit itself raises concerns about whether the auditor can remain fully independent from management. Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate in size for a company of Fiserv's scale, so auditor adequacy is not a concern, but the fee ratio alone is sufficient to warrant a No vote.
Stockholder Proposals
1 proposal submitted by shareholders
Proposal 4
Shareholder Proposal – Independent Board Chairman
John Chevedden is a well-known individual governance activist whose proposals are taken seriously on their merits, and the underlying concern — that Fiserv lacked an independent board chair during a period of significant governance failures — was entirely valid given the stock's collapse and the questions raised about prior management's guidance. However, Fiserv already separated the CEO and Chair roles in May 2025 and appointed Gordon Nixon as independent Chairman effective January 1, 2026, which directly and fully addresses the proposal's core ask; supporting a binding policy requiring an independent chair in perpetuity when the board has already adopted this structure voluntarily would unnecessarily constrain the board's flexibility without providing additional protection to shareholders. Because the specific governance deficiency cited by the proposal has been remediated, a FOR vote is not warranted at this time.
Overall Assessment
Fiserv's 2026 annual meeting ballot is dominated by severe governance and performance concerns: the stock has lost roughly half its value over three years while compensation peers rose meaningfully, triggering AGAINST votes for five of eleven director nominees (those with tenure overlapping the underperformance) and an AGAINST on Say on Pay driven by $70M in CEO pay that is misaligned with shareholder outcomes. The auditor ratification also draws an AGAINST because non-audit fees exceed audit fees, raising independence concerns, while the independent chair stockholder proposal receives an AGAINST because the board has already fully addressed the underlying concern by appointing an independent chairman in January 2026.
Compensation Peer Group
18 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing