FISERV INC (FISV)

Sector: Financials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

FISERV INC · Meeting: May 21, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

6

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

AGAINST

Director Elections

Election of Directors

6 FOR/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Michael P. LyonsTSR underperformance trigger: 3-year FISV return -49.5% vs peer median +5.0%, gap of -54.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director joined 2025 but serves as CEO and is subject to TSR trigger; 5-year TSR also deeply negative (-54.3% vs peer median +13.0%, gap -67.3pp exceeds threshold)

As CEO and director since 2025, Mr. Lyons joined during an already-distressed period, but both the 3-year TSR gap (-54.5pp vs. the 20pp threshold for negative absolute returns) and the 5-year TSR gap (-67.3pp) far exceed the policy trigger thresholds, and the 5-year mitigant does not rescue this vote because the 5-year underperformance also exceeds the applicable threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Henrique de CastroTSR underperformance trigger: director since 2019, tenure fully overlaps 3-year and 5-year underperformance period; 3-year gap -54.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year gap -67.3pp also exceeds threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Mr. de Castro has served since 2019, meaning his tenure fully covers the period of severe stock underperformance; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.

✗ AGAINST
Harry F. DiSimoneTSR underperformance trigger: director since 2018, tenure fully overlaps 3-year and 5-year underperformance period; 3-year gap -54.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year gap -67.3pp also exceeds threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Mr. DiSimone has served since 2018, meaning his tenure fully covers the period of severe stock underperformance; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.

✗ AGAINST
Wafaa MamilliTSR underperformance trigger: director since 2021, tenure substantially overlaps 3-year underperformance period; 3-year gap -54.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year gap -67.3pp also exceeds threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Ms. Mamilli has served since 2021, meaning her tenure substantially overlaps the 3-year underperformance period; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.

✗ AGAINST
Charlotte B. YarkoniTSR underperformance trigger: director since 2023, tenure overlaps the core of the 3-year underperformance period; 3-year gap -54.5pp exceeds 20pp threshold; 5-year gap -67.3pp also exceeds threshold, so 5-year mitigant does not apply

Ms. Yarkoni has served since 2023, meaning her tenure covers a meaningful portion of the 3-year underperformance period; the 3-year TSR gap of -54.5pp far exceeds the 20pp trigger for negative absolute returns, and the 5-year TSR gap of -67.3pp also exceeds the threshold, so the longer-term mitigant does not rescue a FOR vote.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Gordon M. NixonDirector joined January 2026 — within 24-month exemption window

Mr. Nixon joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.

✓ FOR
Stephanie E. CohenDirector joined March 2025 — within 24-month exemption window

Ms. Cohen joined the board in March 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to her.

✓ FOR
Céline DufételDirector joined January 2026 — within 24-month exemption window

Ms. Dufétel joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to her.

✓ FOR
Lance M. FritzDirector joined 2024 — tenure less than 24 months, partial overlap with underperformance period; flagged but not automatically voted Against

Mr. Fritz joined in 2024, giving him less than 24 months of tenure and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, this warrants a flag but does not automatically trigger a No vote, and no other disqualifying factors are present.

✓ FOR
Ajei S. GopalDirector joined 2024 — tenure less than 24 months, partial overlap with underperformance period; flagged but not automatically voted Against

Mr. Gopal joined in 2024, giving him less than 24 months of tenure and covering less than half of the 3-year underperformance period; under the policy, this warrants a flag but does not automatically trigger a No vote, and no other disqualifying factors are present.

✓ FOR
Gary S. ShedlinDirector joined January 2026 — within 24-month exemption window

Mr. Shedlin joined the board in January 2026, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption period, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.

Fiserv's stock has lost roughly half its value over three years while the disclosed compensation peer group median rose 5%, a gap of -54.5 percentage points that far exceeds the 20pp trigger threshold applicable to a company with negative absolute 3-year TSR. The 5-year gap (-67.3pp) is equally severe, meaning the policy's 5-year mitigant cannot convert any AGAINST vote to FOR. Directors with tenure meaningfully overlapping the underperformance period (de Castro, DiSimone, Mamilli, Yarkoni, and CEO Lyons) receive AGAINST votes; the four directors who joined in 2024-2026 receive FOR votes under the new-director exemption or partial-tenure flag rule.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Michael P. Lyons

Total Comp

$70,341,992

Prior Support

91%%

CEO total reported compensation of $70.3M is driven primarily by large sign-on replacement awards ($11.7M cash + $29.9M replacement equity) but even excluding those, the reported total remains deeply above benchmark for a newly appointed CEO at a $30B market-cap fintech companyPay-for-performance misalignment: variable/incentive pay substantially above benchmark while FISV 3-year TSR is -49.5% vs peer median +5.0%, a -54.5pp gapAnnual cash incentive was zeroed out for missed targets — a positive signal — but large discretionary sign-on and supplemental equity awards ($30M Supplemental CEO Award in Feb 2026) inflate total pay regardless of performance outcomesSupplemental CEO Award of ~$30M granted in early 2026 (on top of 2025 reported pay) for a CEO who joined in January 2025 raises concerns about pay not tied to demonstrated performance

The CEO's total reported compensation of $70.3 million for 2025 is exceptionally high for the leader of a company whose stock fell nearly 75% during the year and whose shareholders have experienced a 3-year total return of -49.5% while the peer group median returned +5.0% — a gap of more than 54 percentage points. While the company appropriately zeroed out the annual cash bonus for missing targets, the bulk of Mr. Lyons's pay consisted of large replacement and sign-on awards that vest regardless of Fiserv's own performance outcomes, effectively functioning as fixed pay disguised as variable pay, which is exactly the condition our policy flags as a No vote. Additionally, the board granted Mr. Lyons a supplemental retention equity award worth approximately $30 million in early 2026 — before he had completed even a full year as CEO — at a time when shareholders were still absorbing devastating losses, and this level of discretionary above-benchmark incentive pay is not consistent with the shareholder experience.

Auditor Ratification

✗ AGAINST

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$12,211,000

Non-Audit Fees

$12,723,000

Non-audit fee ratio exceeds 50% threshold: non-audit fees (audit-related $11,142,000 + tax $1,581,000 = $12,723,000) represent approximately 104% of core audit fees ($12,211,000)

The fees paid to Deloitte for services other than the core audit — including audit-related work such as service organization reports and registration statement reviews ($11,142,000) plus tax consulting ($1,581,000), totaling $12,723,000 — exceed the core audit fee of $12,211,000 by a ratio of roughly 104%, well above the 50% threshold in our policy; a non-audit relationship this large relative to the audit itself raises concerns about whether the auditor can remain fully independent from management. Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate in size for a company of Fiserv's scale, so auditor adequacy is not a concern, but the fee ratio alone is sufficient to warrant a No vote.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Shareholder Proposal – Independent Board Chairman

✗ AGAINST
Filed by:John CheveddenIndividual ActivistGovernance
Board recommends: AGAINST
Company already has an independent board chair (Gordon Nixon appointed January 1, 2026)Proposal asks company to adopt a binding policy requiring an independent chair at all times — the underlying governance concern has been fully remediatedFiler is a credible individual governance activist; proposal taken seriously on merits

John Chevedden is a well-known individual governance activist whose proposals are taken seriously on their merits, and the underlying concern — that Fiserv lacked an independent board chair during a period of significant governance failures — was entirely valid given the stock's collapse and the questions raised about prior management's guidance. However, Fiserv already separated the CEO and Chair roles in May 2025 and appointed Gordon Nixon as independent Chairman effective January 1, 2026, which directly and fully addresses the proposal's core ask; supporting a binding policy requiring an independent chair in perpetuity when the board has already adopted this structure voluntarily would unnecessarily constrain the board's flexibility without providing additional protection to shareholders. Because the specific governance deficiency cited by the proposal has been remediated, a FOR vote is not warranted at this time.

Overall Assessment

Fiserv's 2026 annual meeting ballot is dominated by severe governance and performance concerns: the stock has lost roughly half its value over three years while compensation peers rose meaningfully, triggering AGAINST votes for five of eleven director nominees (those with tenure overlapping the underperformance) and an AGAINST on Say on Pay driven by $70M in CEO pay that is misaligned with shareholder outcomes. The auditor ratification also draws an AGAINST because non-audit fees exceed audit fees, raising independence concerns, while the independent chair stockholder proposal receives an AGAINST because the board has already fully addressed the underlying concern by appointing an independent chairman in January 2026.

Filing date: April 2, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

18 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ADBEAdobe Inc.
AXPAmerican Express Company
ADPAutomatic Data Processing, Inc.
BLKBlackRock, Inc.
SQBlock, Inc.
CTSHCognizant Technology Solutions Corporation
DFSDiscover Financial Services
FISFidelity National Information Services, Inc.
GPNGlobal Payments Inc.
INTUIntuit Inc.
MAMastercard Incorporated
NDAQNasdaq, Inc.
PAYXPaychex, Inc.
PYPLPayPal Holdings, Inc.
CRMSalesforce, Inc.
SPGIS&P Global Inc.
BKThe Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
VVisa Inc.