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SAFEHOLD INC (SAFE)

Sector: Real Estate

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

SAFEHOLD INC · Meeting: May 14, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

0

Directors AGAINST

5

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of five directors

/5 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Jay Sugarman⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3-year price return -65.5% vs ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) +9.4%, a gap of -74.9pp vs 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; 5-year return -81.5% confirms sustained underperformance, no mitigant applies; long-serving CEO-Chairman with full tenure overlap

Safehold's stock has lost approximately 65.5% of its value over the past three years while the equity REIT benchmark ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) gained 9.4%, a gap of nearly 75 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns, and the five-year record (-81.5% vs the benchmark) confirms this is sustained destruction of shareholder value rather than a temporary dip, making a vote against the long-serving Chairman and CEO appropriate.

✗ AGAINST
Stefan Selig⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3-year price return -65.5% vs ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) +9.4%, gap of -74.9pp vs 30pp threshold; director since 2017 (Old SAFE) giving full tenure overlap; 5-year return -81.5% confirms no mitigant

Mr. Selig has served as lead independent director since at least the 2023 merger and as a director of Old SAFE since 2017, meaning his tenure fully overlaps the severe underperformance period; the stock's three-year decline of 65.5% against a benchmark gain of 9.4% (a gap of 74.9 percentage points) and an even worse five-year record leave no basis for the mitigating 5-year exception, making an against vote appropriate.

✗ AGAINST
Robin Josephs⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3-year price return -65.5% vs ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) +9.4%, gap of -74.9pp vs 30pp threshold; director since 1998 giving full tenure overlap; 5-year return -81.5% confirms no mitigant

Ms. Josephs has served on the board since 1998 and chairs the Audit Committee, giving her complete tenure overlap with the three-year underperformance period; with the stock down 65.5% against the ^FNER benchmark's 9.4% gain and the five-year return even worse at -81.5%, the underperformance is long-standing and deep, supporting an against vote.

✗ AGAINST
Jay Nydick⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3-year price return -65.5% vs ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) +9.4%, gap of -74.9pp vs 30pp threshold; director since 2017 (Old SAFE) giving full tenure overlap; 5-year return -81.5% confirms no mitigant

Mr. Nydick has served on the board since 2017 and chairs the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, with full overlap over the underperformance period; the 74.9-percentage-point gap between Safehold's three-year return and the ^FNER benchmark return more than doubles the 30-point trigger, and the five-year performance is equally poor, warranting an against vote.

✗ AGAINST
Barry Ridings⚑ TSR underperformance trigger: 3-year price return -65.5% vs ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) +9.4%, gap of -74.9pp vs 30pp threshold; director since 2011 giving full tenure overlap; 5-year return -81.5% confirms no mitigant

Mr. Ridings has served on the board since 2011 and chairs the Compensation Committee, meaning he has been on the board for the entirety of the underperformance period and longer; the 74.9-percentage-point three-year return gap against the ^FNER benchmark and a five-year return of -81.5% represent sustained, deep value destruction that triggers an against vote with no available mitigant.

For Analysis

All five director nominees are voted AGAINST. Safehold's stock has declined 65.5% over three years while the equity REIT benchmark ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) returned +9.4%, a gap of -74.9 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold applicable when absolute returns are negative. The five-year performance (-81.5%) confirms this is sustained underperformance rather than a transient dip, eliminating the 5-year mitigant. Every nominee has served since at least the 2023 merger (and most since 2017 or earlier), providing full tenure overlap with the underperformance period. No overboarding or attendance issues are noted.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Jay Sugarman

Total Comp

$2,627,089

Prior Support

85%%

The CEO's total reported compensation of $2,627,089 is relatively modest for a company of Safehold's size and complexity, with base salary held flat at $600,000 and Mr. Sugarman voluntarily reducing his annual incentive award and converting it entirely to stock; the prior year's Say-on-Pay vote received 85% support, well above the 70% concern threshold, so no remediation obligation is triggered. The pay structure is predominantly variable and performance-linked, with the annual incentive based on a scorecard of six pre-established corporate goals, a meaningful clawback policy is in place, and fixed salary represents a minority of total compensation, satisfying the pay-mix requirement; while stock performance has been poor, the pay level itself does not appear excessive relative to a CEO of a ~$1 billion market cap REIT, and incentive pay was not inflated given the modest total.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

$1,109,963

Non-Audit Fees

$172,179

Non-audit fees (tax services of $172,179) represent approximately 15.5% of audit fees ($1,109,963), well below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Safehold's size; auditor tenure is not disclosed in the proxy so no tenure trigger can fire; and there are no disclosed material financial restatements.

Overall Assessment

This is a four-proposal ballot for Safehold's 2026 annual meeting; the dominant issue is severe, sustained stock underperformance — the stock has lost 65.5% over three years while the equity REIT benchmark ^FNER (FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index) gained 9.4% — which triggers against votes for all five director nominees, while the auditor and Say-on-Pay proposals both pass their respective policy screens and receive FOR determinations. The equity plan amendment (Proposal 3) falls outside the scope of this policy version and no vote determination is issued for it.

Filing date: March 31, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence