SNOWFLAKE INC (SNOW)

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

SNOWFLAKE INC · Meeting: June 29, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

2

Directors AGAINST

1

Say on Pay

AGAINST

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Teresa Briggs, Mark D. McLaughlin, and Sridhar Ramaswamy as Class III Directors

2 FOR/1 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Teresa BriggsTSR underperformance trigger: SNOW 3yr TSR -1.9% vs peer median +39.0%, gap of -40.9pp exceeds 20pp threshold for negative/near-zero absolute TSR; 5yr TSR -28.2% vs peer median +9.2%, gap of -37.4pp also exceeds threshold — no 5yr mitigant applies; director has served since December 2019, full tenure overlap with underperformance period

Ms. Briggs has served since December 2019, giving her full tenure overlap with Snowflake's 3-year period of significant underperformance versus its disclosed peer group — the stock returned -1.9% over three years while the peer median returned +39.0%, a gap of 40.9 percentage points that exceeds the 20-point trigger threshold for companies with near-zero absolute returns; the 5-year record (-28.2% vs. peer median +9.2%) does not provide a mitigating longer track record, so the AGAINST vote stands.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Mark D. McLaughlindirector joined April 2023 less than 36 months tenure partial overlap mitigant applied

Mr. McLaughlin joined the board in April 2023, giving him less than three years of tenure; the policy exempts directors who joined within 24 months and applies a proportional flag for those with less than three years of tenure covering less than half the underperformance period — his tenure covers only a portion of the measurement window, and his relevant cybersecurity and technology industry expertise provides clear qualifications for service, so no AGAINST vote is warranted.

✓ FOR
Sridhar Ramaswamydirector joined February 2024 within 24 months exempt from TSR trigger

Mr. Ramaswamy joined the board in February 2024 as CEO, which is within the 24-month exemption window under the policy — new directors are given reasonable time to contribute before being held accountable for prior-period performance, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him.

Of the three Class III nominees, Teresa Briggs receives an AGAINST vote due to full tenure overlap with Snowflake's significant 3-year TSR underperformance versus its disclosed peer group (stock returned -1.9% versus peer median of +39.0%, a 40.9pp gap exceeding the 20pp trigger threshold), with no 5-year mitigant available. Mark McLaughlin and Sridhar Ramaswamy receive FOR votes due to short tenures that limit accountability for the prior underperformance period.

Say on Pay

✗ AGAINST

CEO

Sridhar Ramaswamy

Total Comp

$101,325,374

Prior Support

30%%

prior say on pay support below 70%: only ~30% support at 2025 annual meetingchanges made but incomplete: FY2026 refresh awards remain on 1-year performance periods; FY2027 program redesign is forward-looking only and not reflected in the compensation being voted onCEO total compensation FY2025 $101.3M materially above benchmark: the FY2025 grant included a single large award covering multiple future years reported all at once, driving the outsized total

Snowflake received only approximately 30% shareholder support on last year's Say-on-Pay vote — far below the 70% threshold that would indicate meaningful shareholder endorsement — and while the company conducted extensive outreach and has announced a redesigned performance stock award program for fiscal year 2027, those changes are forward-looking and do not apply to the fiscal year 2026 compensation being voted on today. The CEO's reported total compensation for fiscal year 2025 (the year that included the large new-hire grant package) was $101.3 million, which reflects a single large award covering multiple future years reported all at once and which drove the shareholder dissatisfaction; the fiscal year 2026 refresh compensation of approximately $22.3 million is more moderate, but the FY2026 performance stock awards still used only one-year performance periods — the core concern shareholders expressed — and the company declines to disclose specific performance targets, limiting shareholders' ability to assess rigor. Given the policy requirement to vote AGAINST when prior support was below 70% and changes to the compensation structure have not yet been implemented in the period being voted on, an AGAINST vote is warranted.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Tenure

7 yrs

Audit Fees

$4,634,000

Non-Audit Fees

$2,007,000

PwC has served as Snowflake's auditor since 2019 (approximately 7 years), well below the 25-year tenure threshold that would raise independence concerns. Non-audit fees (audit-related fees of $1,009,000 plus tax fees of $996,000 plus other fees of $2,000, totaling approximately $2,007,000) represent about 43% of core audit fees of $4,634,000, which is below the 50% threshold that would raise independence concerns. PwC is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a company of Snowflake's size and complexity, and all fees were pre-approved by the Audit Committee.

Stockholder Proposals

1 proposal submitted by shareholders

Proposal 4

Stockholder Proposal Requesting Majority Vote for Director Elections

✓ FOR
Filed by:James McRitchieIndividual ActivistGovernance
Prior-year support: 73% (The proxy states that since 2021, proposals by James McRitchie on this topic have averaged 73% in favor at other companies; no specific prior-year vote at Snowflake is disclosed for this proposal, suggesting this is the first time it has appeared on Snowflake's ballot)
Board recommends: AGAINST
credible governance activist filer: James McRitchie has a well-established track record of governance-focused proposalsmainstream governance improvement: majority voting adopted by over 92% of S&P 500 companiesgovernance ask type: lower bar to supportlarge institutional investor support: Vanguard and BlackRock both have policies supporting majority voting proposalsboard opposition weak: arguments cite administrative inconvenience rather than substantive shareholder harm

This proposal is submitted by James McRitchie, a well-known individual governance activist with a consistent track record of filing shareholder-value-focused governance proposals — he is not an ideological filer, so the proposal is evaluated on its merits. The ask is a mainstream governance improvement: switching from plurality voting (where a director can be elected with even a single vote in an uncontested election) to majority voting (where a director must receive more than half of votes cast to be seated), which more than 92% of S&P 500 companies have already adopted and which Vanguard and BlackRock — two of Snowflake's largest shareholders — both support as a matter of policy. The board's opposition focuses on the administrative complexity of potential 'failed elections,' but this concern is standard boilerplate and does not address the fundamental accountability benefit to shareholders; given the credible filer, the broad market adoption of this practice, and the explicit support of major institutional shareholders, a FOR vote is warranted.

Overall Assessment

Snowflake's 2026 annual meeting ballot presents a mixed picture: the company has made meaningful efforts to respond to last year's dismal 30% Say-on-Pay result through extensive shareholder engagement and a redesigned performance award program for fiscal year 2027, but those improvements are not yet reflected in the fiscal year 2026 compensation being voted on, requiring an AGAINST on Say-on-Pay. On the director slate, Teresa Briggs receives an AGAINST vote due to full tenure overlap with significant stock underperformance versus peers, while a FOR vote is appropriate on auditor ratification (PwC fees and tenure are within policy limits) and on the majority-voting stockholder proposal (a mainstream governance improvement supported by major institutional shareholders).

Filing date: May 18, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

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