STRATEGIC EDUCATION INC (STRA)

Sector: Consumer Discretionary

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

STRATEGIC EDUCATION INC · Meeting: April 22, 2026

Policy v1.2medium confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

4

Directors AGAINST

8

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Directors

4 FOR/8 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Robert S. SilbermanTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; long tenure since 2001

Silberman has served since 2001 and STRA's 3-year stock return trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points — far exceeding the 35-point trigger for low-positive absolute returns — and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, indicating sustained rather than transient underperformance.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Charlotte F. BeasonTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; long tenure since 1996

Beason has served since 1996 and STRA's 3-year stock return trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points — well above the 35-point trigger — and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, confirming sustained underperformance during her tenure.

✗ AGAINST
Rita D. BrogleyTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; tenure since 2018

Brogley has served since August 2018, giving her full tenure overlap with the underperformance period; STRA's 3-year return lags the peer median by 92.7 percentage points, far exceeding the 35-point trigger, and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold.

✗ AGAINST
Robert R. GruskyTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; long tenure since 2001

Grusky has served since 2001 and STRA's 3-year stock return trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points — far exceeding the 35-point trigger — and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, confirming that underperformance is not a recent blip.

✗ AGAINST
Karl McDonnellTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; tenure as director since 2011; executive director subject to same TSR trigger

McDonnell has served as a director since 2011 and as CEO since 2013; STRA's 3-year stock return trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points (threshold: 35pp), and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold — the TSR trigger applies to executive directors independently of the Say on Pay vote.

✗ AGAINST
Dr. Michael A. McRobbieTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; tenure since July 2021

McRobbie joined in July 2021, giving him more than 24 months of tenure with full overlap over the 3-year underperformance window; the 3-year gap of -92.7pp far exceeds the 35-point trigger and the 5-year mitigant does not apply favorably since the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold.

✗ AGAINST
William J. SlocumTSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; tenure since April 2021

Slocum was elected in April 2021, giving him more than 24 months of tenure with substantial overlap with the underperformance period; the 3-year gap of -92.7pp far exceeds the 35-point trigger and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, confirming sustained underperformance.

✗ AGAINST
G. Thomas Waite, IIITSR underperformance vs peer group: 3yr gap -92.7pp exceeds 35pp threshold for low-positive TSR; 5yr gap -79.4pp also exceeds threshold; long tenure since 1996

Waite has served since 1996, giving him full overlap with the underperformance period; STRA's 3-year stock return trails the company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points (threshold: 35pp), and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable threshold, confirming sustained multi-year underperformance on his watch.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Viet D. Dinh

Dinh joined in September 2023, which is less than 24 months before this meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the new-director exemption.

✓ FOR
Gregory W. Cappelli

Cappelli was elected at the April 2025 annual meeting, meaning his tenure is less than 24 months at the time of this meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the new-director exemption.

✓ FOR
Dr. Benjamin E. Sasse

Sasse was elected to the Board in April 2024, meaning his tenure is less than 24 months at the time of this meeting, so he is exempt from the TSR underperformance trigger under the new-director exemption.

✓ FOR
Michael J. Thawley

Thawley joined the Board in September 2022, which is less than 36 months ago but more than 24 months, so the proportional rule applies; however, his tenure covers less than half of the full 3-year underperformance measurement period (joining mid-way through), which is a mitigating factor that warrants a FOR vote rather than an automatic AGAINST.

The board has 12 nominees. STRA's 3-year total return of +4.6% trails its company-disclosed peer group median by 92.7 percentage points — far exceeding the 35-point trigger for low-positive absolute returns — and the 5-year gap of -79.4pp also exceeds the applicable 35-point threshold, meaning the 5-year mitigant does not rescue any triggering directors. Four directors are exempt: Dinh and Cappelli joined within 24 months; Sasse joined within 24 months; and Thawley joined mid-way through the 3-year window, covering less than half the period. AGAINST votes are warranted for the eight directors whose tenure meaningfully overlaps the full underperformance period.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Karl McDonnell

Total Comp

$5,672,067

Prior Support

98%%

CEO Karl McDonnell's total compensation of $5,672,067 is within a reasonable range for a CEO at a ~$1.8B Consumer Defensive company, and the pay structure is heavily weighted toward performance-based equity (roughly 57% of total pay is the stock award with 4-year cliff vesting tied to regulatory and accreditation performance conditions), meeting the 50-60% variable pay standard. The prior year Say on Pay vote received 98% support, signaling no shareholder concern, and the company has a meaningful clawback policy covering restatements and miscalculated metrics. While STRA's stock has significantly underperformed its peers, the variable pay is structured around regulatory compliance, accreditation, revenue, operating income, and EPS targets rather than pure stock-price outcomes, and the incentive payout of 108.8% of target is consistent with above-threshold financial performance in 2025.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

N/A

Audit Fees

N/A

Non-Audit Fees

N/A

The proxy filing does not include a fee table disclosing audit and non-audit fees, so the non-audit fee ratio trigger cannot be applied; tenure is not disclosed and per policy a FOR vote is the default when tenure cannot be confirmed; Deloitte is a Big 4 firm appropriate for a $1.8B market cap company, and no material restatements are disclosed.

Overall Assessment

The 2026 STRA annual meeting presents three standard proposals. The most significant governance concern is severe stock price underperformance relative to peers — STRA's 3-year return of +4.6% trails the peer median by 92.7 percentage points — triggering AGAINST votes for eight of twelve director nominees, including the CEO-director and several long-tenured board members; Say on Pay passes on the strength of a well-structured, heavily performance-weighted compensation program with strong prior shareholder support.

Filing date: March 11, 2026·Policy v1.2·medium confidence

Compensation Peer Group

9 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

ATGEAdtalem Global Education Inc.
GHCGraham Holdings Company
LOPEGrand Canyon Education, Inc.
WLYJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.
LAURLaureate Education, Inc.
PSOPearson PLC
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation
LRNStride, Inc.
UDMYUdemy, Inc.