MONTROSE ENVIRONMENTAL GRP INC (MEG)

Sector: Industrials

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2026 Annual Meeting Analysis

MONTROSE ENVIRONMENTAL GRP INC · Meeting: May 6, 2026

Policy v1.2high confidenceView Filing ↗
For informational purposes only. This AI-generated analysis applies a published voting policy to publicly available proxy filings. It does not constitute investment advice, proxy voting advice, or a solicitation of any kind. AI analysis may be incomplete or inaccurate — always review the actual filing and make your own independent decision.

Directors FOR

1

Directors AGAINST

2

Say on Pay

FOR

Auditor

FOR

Director Elections

Election of Three Directors to Hold Office Until the 2027 Annual Meeting of Stockholders

1 FOR/2 AGAINST

Against Analysis

✗ AGAINST
Peter M. GrahamTSR underperformance trigger: MEG 3-year return -33.4% vs ^RUT (Russell 2000) +42.9%, gap of -76.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director tenure since June 2017 fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR also deeply negative (-47.4%) confirming sustained underperformance, no mitigant applies

Mr. Graham has served on the board since June 2017, meaning his tenure fully covers the three-year period during which MEG's stock fell roughly 33% while the Russell 2000 index (^RUT — Russell 2000) rose about 43% — a gap of approximately 76 percentage points, far exceeding the 30-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; the five-year record is equally poor (MEG down ~47% vs the benchmark), confirming this is sustained underperformance rather than a temporary dip, so no mitigating downgrade applies.

✗ AGAINST
Richard E. PerlmanTSR underperformance trigger: MEG 3-year return -33.4% vs ^RUT (Russell 2000) +42.9%, gap of -76.3pp exceeds 30pp threshold for negative absolute TSR; director tenure since December 2013 and Chairman since July 2019 fully overlaps underperformance period; 5-year TSR also deeply negative (-47.4%) confirming sustained underperformance, no mitigant applies

Mr. Perlman has served as a director since 2013 and as non-executive Chairman since 2019, meaning his tenure spans the entire underperformance period during which MEG's stock fell roughly 33% while the Russell 2000 index (^RUT — Russell 2000) rose about 43% — a gap of approximately 76 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point trigger threshold for companies with negative absolute returns; as Chairman, he bears particular responsibility for board oversight of this sustained value destruction, and the five-year record (-47% vs the benchmark) confirms no recovery trend, so the vote remains AGAINST.

For Analysis

✓ FOR
Vincent P. Colman

Mr. Colman joined the board in February 2025, which is within the 24-month new-director exemption window, so the TSR underperformance trigger does not apply to him; he also brings strong financial expertise as a former PricewaterhouseCoopers partner with nearly 40 years of experience and no overboarding or attendance concerns.

Of the three Class III director nominees standing for election to one-year terms, Vincent Colman receives a FOR vote because he joined the board in early 2025 and falls within the 24-month new-director exemption from the stock performance trigger. Peter Graham (director since 2017) and Richard Perlman (director since 2013, Chairman since 2019) both receive AGAINST votes because MEG's stock has lost roughly 33% over three years while the Russell 2000 index (^RUT — Russell 2000) gained approximately 43%, a gap of about 76 percentage points that far exceeds the 30-point policy threshold, and the five-year record is equally poor, confirming sustained rather than temporary underperformance.

Say on Pay

✓ FOR

CEO

Vijay Manthripragada

Total Comp

$3,149,000

Prior Support

87.3%%

The prior year Say on Pay vote received strong support at 87.3%, well above the 70% threshold that would require a response, and the company has maintained a meaningful clawback policy with a three-year lookback. CEO total compensation of $3,149,000 for fiscal 2025 — consisting of a $950,000 base salary (30% of total) and $2,185,000 cash bonus (69% of total) with no new equity granted in 2025 — reflects a pay mix that is heavily variable and performance-driven, as the cash bonus was paid at maximum (200% of target) only because the company exceeded its adjusted EBITDA target by more than 7%, satisfying a formulaic plan with a genuine performance hurdle plus required strategic deliverables. While MEG's stock has significantly underperformed the Russell 2000 index (^RUT — Russell 2000) over three years, the variable pay here was tied to an internal EBITDA metric rather than stock price, the company is actively developing a new long-term incentive plan with at least 50% performance-based awards beginning in 2027, and the aggregate pay level does not appear materially above benchmark for a CEO at a company of this size and sector, so the pay-for-performance structure passes the policy screens despite the poor stock performance.

Auditor Ratification

✓ FOR

Auditor

Deloitte & Touche LLP

Tenure

10 yrs

Audit Fees

$1,647,000

Non-Audit Fees

$0

Deloitte has audited MEG since 2016 (approximately 10 years), well below the 25-year tenure threshold that would raise independence concerns; non-audit fees in 2025 were zero, meaning the non-audit fee ratio is 0% — far below the 50% threshold — so no independence concern exists, and Deloitte is a Big Four firm appropriate for a company of MEG's size and complexity.

Overall Assessment

MEG's 2026 annual meeting ballot contains three proposals: the auditor ratification earns a FOR vote given zero non-audit fees and a tenured Big Four firm, and the Say on Pay earns a FOR vote given strong prior-year support, a genuinely performance-driven bonus structure, and a credible commitment to a new long-term incentive plan. However, two of the three director nominees — Chairman Richard Perlman and Compensation Committee Chair Peter Graham — receive AGAINST votes because MEG's stock has dramatically underperformed the Russell 2000 index (^RUT — Russell 2000) over both three and five years, reflecting sustained value destruction that the board has not reversed during their lengthy tenures.

Filing date: March 24, 2026·Policy v1.2·high confidence

Compensation Peer Group

1 companies disclosed in 2026 proxy filing

^RUT__INDEX_BENCHMARK__:Russell 2000 Index